Impressions of a promisor after social deprivation or sa tia tion *t ROBERT BROWN, R. BOB 8MITH 111, and JAME8 T. TEDESCHI State University of New York at Albany, Albany, N.Y. 12203 In an attempt to gain further knowledge of impression formation under actual interaction conditions, male 8s were either socially isolated or satiated prior to an interaction with a simulated promisor in a prisoner's dilemma game that was modified by a message. The resuIts indicated that. a 100% credible promisor was evaluated more positively than a 0% credible promisor, isolated Ss perceived the simulated other as less potent than did satiated Ss, and 8s in the isolation-100% credibility condition liked the simulated other less than 8s in any other condition.
Most of the research investigating the formation of interpersonal impressions has relied upon adjective checklists (cf. Anderson, 1969) or other paper-and-pencil devices (cf. Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970) .
As a consequence, it is not dear if impressions of abstract people and real persons are formed in the same mann er or by the same laws of *This studY was supported in part by Grant GS-27059 from the National Science Foundation to James T. Tedeschi.
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Psychon. Sei., 1971, Vol. 23 (2) combination. 8ystematic studies are needed to validate the "laws of person perception" developed by paper-and-pencil techniques. The present study was an attempt to gain further knowledge of impression formation under actual interaction conditions. In a 2 by 2 factorial experiment, 8s were either socially isolated or satiated prior to an interaction with a simulated promisor (SP) in a modified prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. The S was sent periodic contingent promises of an additional side payoff for making the cooperative response in the game. The SP kept his word either 0% or 100% of the time.
It was not clear from the literature on the effects of social isolation and satiation (cf. Eisenberger, 1970; Gewirtz, 1967) wh at results should have been expected as a function of that factor. However, Lindskold & Tedeschi (1971) , using the semantic differential (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) , found that a promisor who kept his promises was perceived as evaluatively better (Le., wiser, more honest, more kind, and more good) than a promisor who kept his promises infrequently. The present experiment was conducted in an attempt to replicate this finding and to investigate the influence of social deprivation and satiation on impression formation. SUBJECTS A total of 32 male Ss, who participated for extra credit, were signed up in pairs at the United States International University in the spring of 1970. Ss were led to believe that they were participating with a peer other than the one with whom they signed up. In fact, the "other" person was simulated by the E.
PROCEDURE
The E asked the first 8 who arrived to wait a few minutes in the waiting room. There a male confederate engaged the S in conversation for a period of 10 min, during which time, verbal and nonverbal responses of support, approval, and agreement were emitted in order to satiate_ the S to social reinforcement. l The second 8 to arrive was left alone in a cubicle for 30 min. Isolated Ss were directed to the experimental room by intercom and did not contact any other pe~on en route.
When 8s entered the experimental room, they were confronted with the PD apparatus, wh ich is more fully described elsewhere (Horai & Tedeschi, 1969) . The Ss were observed through a one-way mirror; when seated, they were instructed by tape recording to read the printed instructions provided and to signal when finished by saying, "OK." When the S was ready, the instructions were thoroughly reviewed by tape recording and PD play began. The instructions explained the rudiments of PD play, the matrix values (Le., R = 4, T = 5, 8 = -5, and P = -4), and the prerogatives of the other person to send the displayed message: "If you make Choice 1 on the next trial, I will add 10 points to your counter." Promises were sent to Ss intermittently over the course of 150 iterations of PD play. The SP played a preplanned, but randomized, 50% cooperative strategy.
On promise-relevant trials, the SP was always cooperative, ensuring that the S would win points on that trial no matter what strategy he chose. Depending upon the S's cell assignment, SP either never rewarded compliance to promises or always did so. Upon conclusion of PD play, Ss were asked to complete Byrne's (1969) interpersonal judgment scale (IJS) and the semantic differential (SD), after which they were debriefed and dismissed.
RESULTS
No behavioral effects of either experimental factor on the game play of Ss were found. Promisor credibility did prodUCE the expected evaluative ratings of the SP by Ss (F =8.81, df = 1/24, P < .01). The 100% credible SP was rated as evaluatively positive (X = 2.71), but the 0% credible SP was rated as slightly negative (X = -.928). Although main effects of both factors of the experiment were found on the IJS measure of interpersonal attraction, the significant findings are inrlicated by the interaction (F = 7.56, df = 1/24, p< .03). As can be seen in Fig. 1 , in the 100% promise credibility-isolation condition, the SP was less liked by Ss than in any other condition.
The only finding attributable to the differences in preinteraction social reinforcement was that isolated Ss perceived the SP as less potent (X = -1.78) than did the satiated Ss (X = .714; F = 4.04, . df= 1/24, p < .05). DISCUSSION A completely honest promisor was perceived ~ evaluatively better than a completely dishonest promisor, as indicated by ratings on polar adjectives related to honesty, wisdom, kindness, and goodness. That Ss should rate as evaluatively better a promisor who keeps his word squares with common sense and has been found in other investigations (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lindskold & Tedeschi, 1971; Zajonc & Martin, 1967) .
The fact that isolated Ss perceived the SP as less potent than did the satiated Ss is probably a reflection of the arousal of an affiliative motive (Murray, 1938) in the former Ss. Schachter (1968) has noted that "if condi tions of isolation produce anxiety, conditons of anxiety would lead to the increase of affiliative tendencies." If the affiliative motive was aroused by social isolation, Ss would presumably be prepared to go more than halfway to seek friendly and trusting relationships with the SP. Yet, they found a cooperative and generous partner who apparently was willing to be exploited. As a consequence, the bargaining behavior of the SP produced an impression of "softness" (Bartos, 1970) . Satiated Ss, on the other hand, should not have be en so eager for cooperative relationships, since they had presumably had their affiliative needs satiated before the experimental interaction. Hence, the resolutely accommodative behavior of the promisor must have been perceived as more necessary for conflict resolution, and the SP was consequently viewed as more potent by the satiated Ss. This explanation, though post hoc and speculative, has the virtue of also providing an interpretation for the social reinforcement and promise credibility interaction on the posttest measure of attraction.
It must be remembered that the SP provided an opportunity for mutual cooperation and rewards on promise-relevant ,trials whether or not the additional bribe was given. Since the promise message was the only communication allowed to the SP, his behavior was important in determining the "meaning" of the message (or the Ss. Schlenker et al (1970) have shown that the meaning of a threat is similarly determined by the behavior of the threatener, in addition to the explicit message. Presumably, the investments of the SP and Ss are similar in the experimental setting, and, when the SP transmits a promise and then eooperates hirnself, the Ss may pereeive the additional bribe as irrelevant to the interaction-SP's eredibility is not at stake. Thus, the SP is liked whether or not he is foolishly extravagant, as long as he is c1early aecommodative. The exception to this generalization concerns the ease where the pereeiver has been socially isolated and the promisor is willing to give 10 points in order to win 4 points. Appare ntly, isolated Ss, who themselves were willing to provide the impetus for eooperative relations, pereeived the SP as distrusting of them. Why else would SP find it neeessary to pay a bribe for mutually profitable cooperative responses made by the Ss? When the SP used the promises as if they were noneontingent offers of mutual cooperation, the isolated Ss liked hirn as much as did the satiated Ss. Because the needs and expeetations of the satiated Ss were different from those of the isolated Ss, the former were not offended by an obviously accommodative promisor, even when he offered a tribute in return for confliet resolution.
